WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT (From Plato to Marx) (MPSE-003)
Tutor Marked Assignment

Assignment Code: ASST/ MPSE-003/2022-23
Marks: 100

Answer any five questions in about 500 words each. Attempt at least two questions from each section. Each question carries 20 marks.

SECTION –I

1 Write a note on the significance and relevance of western political thought.

2 Evaluate Plato's political philosophy. What was his contribution to western political thought?

3 Explain St. Thomas Aquinas's views on law and the state and the relations between the Church and the State.

4 Analyse Machiavelli's thoughts on politics and forms of government.

5 Discuss in brief Locke's political theory.

SECTION –II

Write a short note on each part of the question in about 250 words.

6 a) Rousseau on civil society and social contract
b) Edmund Burke on democracy and religion

7 a) Immanuel Kant's political philosophy
b) Jeremy Bentham and utilitarian principles

8 a) Alexis de Tocqueville on religion
b) John Stuart Mill on rights for women

9 a) John Stuart Mill on individual liberty
b) Hegel's philosophy of history

10 a) Marx's vision of a communist society
b) Marx's theory of historical materialism

MPSE-3: WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT (From Plato to Marx)

SECTION –I

Q1. Write a note on the significance and relevance of western political thought.

Ans. Political thought is the description of the political ideas of a host of political philosophers from beginning to the end It is the sum-total of ideas 011 matters relating to politics, state and government as expressed by the thinkers It is historical in nature because it is described as history It analyses, examines and evaluates issues that have a universal concern and are of perennial interest even though each political theorist responds to a particular political reality It is written keeping the larger public in mind and is not confined to ivory towers for an intimate link is established between the political process, institutions, events and actors Usually political theory flourishes in times of crises which act as stilnulus though it is tlot necessary that all crises lead to political theorising

Political thought is the description, analysis, expression, and evaluation of the philosophies of the philosophers of a political tradition. It is a tradition in so far as it comes to us as a body of thought It is the sum-total of what stays on, and an accumulation of what is changed and what continues It is what keeps responding to our What becomes out-dated is not the part of the tradition.

Political thought attempts to identify values and norms and makes tliern an inseparable part of a particular political trend. Westerr1 political thought, if we wish to identify its magic themes, evolves and revolves around values such as liberty and libertarian, democracy and democratic tradition, equality and egalitarian. Political thought as it has existed and/or exists in India, for example, seeks to establish ethical/moral values in politics, spiritualism, cooperative living and the like

Political thought is primarily the study of the' state It studies society insofar as society influences the state as political life and social life, though independent is inter-dependent Similarly it focuses 011 economic institutions and process insofar it influences the political order and process It also takes into consideration ethical questions for ultimately it is concerned with a just and good political order western political thought is political theory spread over history It is the eminent of the writings of numerous political philosophers These writings are works in the field of Political Science which have stood the test of' time They have, survived through ages because of their intrinsic worth. They remain interesting and instructive because of their perennial themes, sound comprehension, subtle style and profound analysis They wield great influence, and are, basically, suggestive

The works of political thought are outstanding not because they are universally praised In fact, they are neither praised nor denounced Plato is rated very high by some like Barker, 'wild. Whitefield who go to the extent of saying (Adventures of ideas) that all subsequent philosophy is a footnote to Plato, while others such as Popper, Crosland and wm spear, condemn him as fascist, totalitarian, and enemy of democracy (see Karl Popper, Open Society and Its Enemies, 1945) Machiavelli, to take

another example, has been denounced by Catholic writers such as Butterfield, but has been admired by secular scholars such as Allen, Gramsci and Wolin. These works on political thought flourish because they are continuously studied, interpreted, and discussed, each subsequent reading gives a new and fresh orientation They are a great aid to thinking It is in this sense that they are suggestive Plato does not impose his communistic" devices for acceptance, but he does stimulate our tied and reactivate it to think other possible devices They are not only suggestive, but are essentially inspirational

About the importance of the western political thought, Sheldon Wolin writes "In teaching about the past theories, the theorist is engaged in the task of political initiation, that is of introducing new generations of the students to the complexities of politics and the efforts of the theorist to confront its predicaments, of developing the capacity for discriminating judgement, and of cultivating that sense of significance which is vital to the scientific enquiry but cannot be furnished by scientific methods, and of exploring the ways itl which new theoretical vistas are opened" Dilthey also says, "In studying classics, we construct our life experience with the aid of experiences of the great thinkers Communication with their experiences enriches our own experience After all, did not Karl Marx write only music can awaken the musical sense in man."

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The great tradition of Western political theory from Plato to hegel deals exhaustively with the major contradictions and dimensions of the political process Their importance is exhibited by the fact that though they were primarily concerned with the immediate problems besetting their contemporary situation, yet they were able to transcend their localism. In the process they were able to provide a framework of analysis that would enrich other periods as well by their penetrating insights and thoughtful reflections on perennial problems of politics, power, authority, legitimacy, equity and order They are masterpieces as they do not belong to any one culture, civilization or time but cherished by the entire humankind

Q2. Evaluate Plato's political philosophy. What was his contribution to western political thought?
Ans. Theory of Justice

For Plato, justice does not consist in mere adherence to the laws, for it is based on the inner nature of the human spirit. It is also not the triumph of the stronger over the weaker, for it protects the weaker against the stronger. A just state, Plato argues, is achieved with an eye to the good of the whole. In a just society, the rulers, the military, the artisan all do what they ought to do. In such a society, the rulers are wise; the soldiers are brave, and the producers exercise self-control or temperance.

'Justice' is the central theme of the Plato's Republic; its sub-title entitled "Concerning Justice". For Plato, justice is a moral concept. Barker says: "Justice is, for Plato, at once a part of human virtue and the bond which joins men together in the states. It makes man good and makes him social." Almost a similar view has been expressed by Sabine. He says: "Justice (for Plato) is a bond which holds a society together."

Justice gives the resemblance of what is used in the Greek language 'Dikaiosyne', a word which has a more comprehensive meaning than the word 'justice'. 'Dikaiosyne' means 'just' 'righteousness'. That is why Plato's notion of justice is not regarded legal or judicial, nor is

it related to the realms of 'rights' and 'duties', it does not come within the limits of law; it is, as such, related to 'social ethics'. The essential characteristics of Plato's notion can be stated as these: (i) Justice is another name of rigliteousness. (ii) It is more the performance of duties than the enjoyment of rights. (iii) It is individual's contribution to the society in accordance with his abilities, capacities and capabilities. (iv) It is a social morality; man's obligation. (v) It is the strength of the social fabric as it involves a web of social system.

Before stating these views through Socrates, Plato refuted the then prevailing theories ofjustice. He denounced the father-son's (Cephalus- Polemarchus) theory ofjustice of traditional morality—justice giving every man his due, in other words, 'doing to others what is proper' (Cephalus) or 'doing good to friends and harming enemies' (Polemarchus). Plato recognised the worth of the traditional theory of justice which compels men to do what they are supposed to do or justice as phenomena creating unity. But he did not approve of justice being good for some and evil for others. Justice is, Plato held, good for all—the giver as well as the receiver, for friends as well as foes.
Plato also rejected Thrasymachus' radical notion of justice according to which justice is always in the interest of the stronger. He did agree with Thrasymachus that the ruler because he knows the art of ruling, has all the power but did not agree that the ruler rules in his own interest. Plato argued through Socrates that the shoe-maker does not wear all the shoes he makes; the farmer does not eat all the crops he prepares; accordingly the ruler does not make all the laws which benefit him. Plato agreed with Thrasymachus that justice is an art, and that one who knows the art is the artist, and none else.

And yet, there is another theory ofjustice advocated by two brothers—Glaucon and Adeimantus, Plato's own brothers. The theory is a conventional theory of justice and one which was favourably agreed to by Plato's hero, Socrates. Glaucon held the view that justice is in the interest of the weaker (as opposed, to Thrasymachus' view that it is in the interest of tlie stranger), and that it is artificial in so far as it the product of customs and conventions Glaucon says: "...men do not suffer injustice freely and without restraint. But the weaker, finding that they suffer more injustice than they can inflict, make a contract one with another neither to do injustice, nor to suffer it to be done; and in pursuance of the contract, they lay down a law, the provisions of which are henceforth the standard of action and the code of justice". Plato did see limitations in Glaucon's theory by describing justice as natural and universal as against Glaucon's notion of it as 'artificial' and 'product' of conventions and customs.

Plato's own theory, as stems from the discussion which went on among characters such as Cephalus, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, Glaucon, Adeimantus and Socrates, appears to be as under:

1) Justice is nothing but tlie principle that each one should pursue a function for which one is fitted by nature; each one to do one's own for one's own and for common good.
2) Justice means specialization and excellence.
3) Justice helps people to be in a society; a bond that holds society; a harmonious union of individuals, of classes with the state. It is a bond that brings together individuals, classes and state into one frame.
4) . Justice is both a 'public' and 'private' virtue. It aims at tlie highest good of the individual (private), and of the whole society (public).

Plato's theory ofjustice leads to division of labour, specialisation and efficiency. It is, therefore, a principle of specialisation, unity, non-interference and harmony. His notion of justice implies a social virtue, a private and public ethics and a moral dictate. And yet Plato's theory ofjustice is totalitarian in the sense that it subordinates individual to the state.

Scheme of Education

Plato's *Republic* is not merely an essay on government, it is, as Rousseau informs us, a treatise on education. The essence of his whole philosophy, as stated in the Republic, was to bring about reforms (political, economic, social as well as moral, intellectual, cultural) in the ancient Greek society. The object of tlie Republic was to locate and thereafter establish justice in the ideal state and his scheme of education aimed, precisely, at that. For Plato, social education is a means to social justice. It is, therefore, not incorrect to say that education, for Plato, had been a solution to all the vexed questions. Education, as Klowsteit tells us, has been an instrument for moral reforms.

Plato's theory of education is an attempt to touch the evil at its very source. It is an attempt to cure a mental malady by a mental medicine. Barker rightly says that Plato's scheme of education brings the soul into that environment which in each stage of its growth is best suited for its development.

Plato's theory of education is important in his political theory. It is important in so far as it 'provides a basis for the ideal state designed to achieve justice. Following his teacher, Socrates, Plato had a belief in the dictum that Virtue is knowledge and for making people virtuous, he made education a very powerful instrument. Plato also believed that education builds man's character and it is, therefore, a necessary condition for extracting man's natural faculties in order to develop his personalities. Education is not a private enterprise for Plato; it is public in so far it provides a moral diagnosisto the social ailments. Barker, speaking for Plato, says that education is a path of social righteousness, and not of social success; it is a way to reach the truth. Education, Plato emphasised, was necessary for all the classes in society, especially for those who govern the people. The rulers, for Plato, are supreme because they are educated by philosophers, for the rule of the philosophers, as Barker explains, is the result of the education they receive.

Plato, in his proposed scheme of education, accepts certain assumptions: (i) soul, being initiative and active, throws up, through education, the best things that are latent in it; (ii) education moulds the character of the growing young; it does not provide eyes to the blind, but it does give vision to men with eyes; it brings soul to the realms of light: it activates and reactivates the individual (iii) each level of education has a pre-assigned function: the elementary education helps individuals give direction to their powers; middle level education helps individuals understand their surroundings: and higher education helps individuals prepare, determine and decide their course of education; (iv) education helps people earn a living and also helps them to become better human beings.

Plato does not want to make education a commercial enterprise. He wants, as Sabine tells us, that education must itself provide the needed means, must see that citizens actually get the training they require, and must be sure that the education supplied is consonant with the harmony and well-being of the state. "Plato's plan, Sabine states, "is therefore, for a state-controlled system of compulsory education. His educational scheme falls naturally into parts, the elementary education, which includes the training of the young persons up to about the age of twenty and culminating in the beginning of military service, and the higher education, intended for those selected persons of both sexes who are to be members of the two ruling classes and extending from the age of twenty to thirty-five".

Plato's scheme of education had both the Athenian and the Spartan influence. Sabine writes: "Its most genuinely Spartan feature was the dedication of education exclusively to civic training. Its content was typically Athenian, and its purpose was dominated by the end of moral and intellectual cultivation." The curriculum of the elementary education was divided into two parts, gymnastics for training the body, and music for training the mind. The elementary education was to be imparted to all the three classes. But after the age of twenty, those selected for higher education were those who were to hold the highest positions in the guardian class between twenty and thirty five. The guardians were to be constituted of the auxiliary class, and the ruling class These two classes were to have a higher dose of gymnasium and music. greater dose of gymnastics for the auxiliaries, and greater dose of music for the rulers. The higher education of the two classes was, in purpose, professional, and for his curriculum Plato chose the only scientific studies — mathematics, astronomy and logic. Before the two classes could get on to their jobs, Plato suggested a further education till the age of about fifty, mostly practical in nature.

In conclusion, we may identify the characteristic features of Plato's scheme of education as these: (i) His scheme of education was for the guardian class, i.e., the auxiliary class and the ruling class; he had ignored the producing class completely; (ii) His whole educational plan was state controlled; (iii) It aimed at attaining the physical, mental, intellectual, moral development of human personality; (iv) It consisted of three stages: elementary between 6 to 20, higher, between 20 and 35; practical, between 35 and 50; (v) It aimed at preparing the rulers for administrative statesmanship; soldiers for militarily skill; and producers for material productivity; (vi) It sought to bring a balance between the individual needs and social requirement,

Plato's plan of education was undemocratically devised in so far as it ignored the producing class. It was limited in nature and was restrictive in extent by laying more emphasis on mathematics than on literature. The whole plan was unexpectedly and unduly expensive. It was un-individual in the sense that it restricted man's thinking process and his autonomy. It was too abstract and too theoretical, so much so, it lost sight of administrative intricacies.

Ideal State : The Ruling Class/Philosophic Ruler

In all his works on political theory, there is a strong case, which Plato builds in favour of an omni-competent state. Living is one thing, but living well is another and perhaps a different thing altogether It is the job of the government, Plato affirmed more than once, to help people live a complete life. The problem which Plato addressed was not how best a government could be created but how best a government could be installed. It was, thus, with Plato, a matter of just not a government, but a just government; just not a government any how, but a perfect government; just not a government any way, but an ideal government, the ideal state.

In the Republic, Plato constructs the ideal state in three successive stages: The *healthy state* or what Glaucon termed as 'the city of pigs', is more or less a social grouping where men get together, on the principles of 'division of labour', and of 'specialisation', to meet their material needs; the *luxurious state*, arising out of the men of a healthy state to quench their thirst of 'sofas and tables', also of 'saucer and sweets', and requiring, thus, a band of 'dogs keen to

scent, swift of foot to pursue, and stray of limb to fight,' the auxiliaries; the just *state*, the ideal one, where among the 'dogs', the philosophers are able to judge by 'the rule of knowing; whom to bite,' that is, 'gentleness to friends and fierceness against enemies', are there to guide the rest. Thus, there is a clear hint of the classes, which constitute the ideal state—the producing class, the auxiliary class, and the ruling class. In the Republic, the state is led by the philosophers; in the *Statesman*, it is a mixed state ideally led by statesman, and in the *Laws*, it is actual state as it is, led by the laws. The ideal state of the *Republic* is the *form* of the historical (Politics) and *actual* (laws) states.

Plato's rulers, either the philosophers of the *Republic*, or statesman of the *Politics* or the impersonal laws of the *Laws* have the responsibilities of preserving and promoting the interests of the whole community. Their aim is, as Plato expressed in the *Republic*, giving order and happiness to the state: "Our aim is founding the state", Plato continues, "was ... the greatest happiness of the whole; we thought that in a state which is ordered with a view to the good of the whole we should be most likely to find justice." Or again, "we mean our guardians to be true saviours and not the destroyer of the State." In the Politics, Plato said that the governors ought to "use their power with a view to the general security and improvement." In the *Laws*, Plato was worried about the "well-being of the state." What he wanted were rulers, and not pretenders—rulers who must know their job and should be able to perform it in the interests of all. They should be wise, courageous, temperate and just—the qualities as expressed in the *Republic*; wise and versed in the traditional customs, the unwritten laws of the divinely remote past, as in the Politics, and work under the dictates of the written laws as in the *Laws*.

The use of analogies in the writings of the ancient Greek thinkers was a usual exercise, showing, as Barker says, "a characteristic of the transition from the old philosophy of nature to the new philosophy of man." His use of analogies demonstrated his love for the art of ruling planning his ruler in the image of an artist. There are the 'dog-soldiers' for guarding and watching the human cattle and also for keeping the wolves—enemies—at bay; 'the shepherd—guardian' for looking after the human sheep—all these are mentioned in the Republic. There is 'the physician-statesman' responsible for the general health of the ruling-state, 'the pilot-statesman', skilled in his art, wise in his job and rich in his experiences, for orderitig the affairs of the ship of the state; 'the weaver-states-man' for a creating a 'just harmony' uniting different elements of human nature—all these are mentioned in the Politics.

Knowledge is the merit which qualifies the rulers to rule their people. It helps them, Plato said, perform their responsibilities in the most perfect manner. The rulers, he insisted, ought to know the science of politics, they ought to use this science, he held, as the artist uses his art. What Plato urged was the very competence of the rulers and strict discipline in the performance of their functions. His rulers do the job of ruling as the peasant does the tilling; the peasant is a peasant because he knows the job of tilling, so that ruler is a ruler because he knows the job of ruling.

Plato did not take any chance which could put the rulers away from their ideals. So there are the communistic devices applied on the rulers as in the *Republic*; the promises from them to be alive to the divinely customs as in the *Politics*, and the demands from them to be loyal to the written codes as in the *Laws*. Plato wanted the art and science of politics to be directed toward the attainment of a just order in which each individual, or each group of individuals does his own appointed function. This is why he makes his rulers experts in their branch of business, this is why he makes his rulers undergo an intensive system of education and training, this is why he makes his rulers lead a life devoid of any personal temptations. His anxiety was to build a perfect and hierarchical society where the rulers are expected to uphold and maintain ideals of justice (Republic), sustentation (Politics) and public good (*Laws*). Plato vested in his philosophic ruler absolute powers on the premise that reason ought to be supreme. However, what he did not safeguard, as rightly pointed out by Popper against was the possible abuse and misuse of unchecked absolute powers no matter how just or wise the ruler might be.

Plato writes in the *Laws*: "[I]f anyone gives too great a power to anything, too large a sail to vessel, too much food to the body, too much authority to the mind, and does not observe the mean, everything is overthrown, and, in the wantonness of excess runs in the one case to disorders, and in the other to injustice ...". His rulers have power, they have power because they have responsibilities, maintaining 'the rule of justice', allowing, 'no innovation in the system of education', and watching 'against the entry either of poverty or of wealth into the state', and keeping the size of the state 'neither large nor small, but one and sufficient.'

Q3. Explain St. Thomas Aquinas's views on law and the state and the relations between the Church and the State.

Ans. Law and the State

The basic postulate and ultimate foundation of St. Thomas's political theory is Eternal Law or Divine Reason which manifests itself on four levels of cosmic reality but remains the same reason throughout. It is eternal, immutable and inviolable. It is both transcendent and immanent in all manifested existence. It is identical with the 'Reason of God and is unknowable in its entirety; man can grasp it only in part. Natural law *(lex naturalis)* is "the participation of a rational creature in eternal law." It is that part of *Lex Aeterna* which man can understand by his reason which is also a divine faculty. What is revealed to man by God and also given in scriptures is called Divine Law. An example of Divine law is the code of conduct which God gave to the Jews or revealed to Christ. Divine Law, though higher than natural law, does not annul it. It adds to it. Human law is the application of Natural law to human affairs and political authority. This law, though it emanates from Natural Law, is relative and contingent, it varies with changing conditions and requirement of society A competent human authority that has the care of the community must therefore, promulgate it. St. Thomas defines it as follows:

"A law is some ordinance of reason for the common good promulgated by him who has the care of community."

It is clear that for St. Thomas law is the source of all political authority. He is opposed to the voluntarism theory of law, which regards law as the expression of the will of the sovereign authority He draws a distinction between the *principum* or essential substance of authority which is ordained of God, its *modus* or constitutional form which is determined by people and its *exercitium*, or actual enjoyment that is conferred by people. "But properly a law is first and foremost an ordinance for the common good, and the right to ordain anything for the common good belongs either to the whole multitude or to some one who acts in the place of the whole multitude; therefore the authority to establish law pertains either to the whole multitude, or it pertains to a public person who has the care of the whole multitude."

St. Thomas theory of political authority emphasises the responsibility of the government to the community which is the custodian of the common good. But it should not be taken to imply either a doctrine of popular sovereignty or a constitutional system of government in the modern sense The responsibility of the prince to the people or to the assembly is not enforceable by any independent agency of the community. As McIlwain puts it, "the prime responsibility of St. Thomas's prince is to God, the author of the law on which all his authority rests; and, in a general, or even in a loose political sense, he might be said to be responsible to the 'multitude' which raised him or his house to the throne and might conceivably sweep them away for acts of tyranny. But in the strict legal sense he is "absolute" in the ordinary administration of human law in his realm. Within this sphere he is without a superior, and is responsible to no man. Of human law, in the sense of coercive force, St. Thomas says, he is wholly free, a monarch '*legibus solutus*'—the equivalent of Bracton's legal dictum that no writ runs against the King" (C.H. McIlwain, pp. 330-331). It is true that St. Thomas was strongly opposed to tyranny. He condemned it as vehemently as John of Salisbury, but he did not go so far as to justify tyranny. Lord Acton's famous aphorism that St Thomas was the first Whig, might be a rhetorical way of highlighting the principle of moral limitation on the power of the government or the state, but, strictly speaking its implications are not very precise or illuminating. If Acton "had in mind a legal limitation of the monarch, St. Thomas was no Whig; if only a moral one, he was certainly not the first"(McIlwain, p.331).

Church and the State

The implication of St. Thomas's theory of law and the state for the relations between church and the state are clear. These institutions represent different interests and concerns of man in the world, and they must work in a spirit of harmony and cooperation to fulfill their respective ends. Of course, in a truly philosophical sense, church is superior to the state, as soul is superior to body; but both have to work together for the attainment of the ultimate purpose which is salvation or the attainment of the beatific vision. Possibility of conflict is inherent in actual life, but what is of vital importance is restraint and balance

For Aquinas the art of politics was just a mere technique, which could not be measured solely by its achievements, by standards of efficiency and success. The reason for this is that politics would always imply a moral responsibility, a deliberation, a willingness and a choice. It was not part of purely pragmatic science but part of morals. He emphasised on the importance of choosing the right means and the means in turn depended on the end, and the end was a moral one The end was the common good, an end which was higher in value than that of the individual and that of the family, and which constituted the proper end of politics. As far as the problem of ends and values was concerned Aquinas did not find any contradiction between the revealed truths of Christianity with that of human reasoning Reason and faith, human nature and supernatural values were harmonious in nature. Human beings were endowed by God with the capacity to know the good and, although inclined to do wrong, were capable of performing the good. The Fall did not impair individuals' reasoning capacity. Though human beings know their good they required the help of God to attain salvation

Aquinas also laid down the limits of sovereignty both with regard to internal and international relations. He regarded war as an evil but a necessary evil. It could be justified only within strictest limits. It had to be a 'just war', and for a war to be just special conditions were required—a legitimate authority, a just cause and rightful intention. War was the ultimate resort in the absence of a superior authority. It was connected with the very existence of the particular State, a consequence of its sovereignty and the same time the proof that such sovereignty was neither absolute nor unlimited

Aquinas spoke of secular politics but did argue that temporal sphere was ultimately subject to the spiritual. He placed the common interest of the faithful and their spiritual well being within the sphere of the church as educator, promoting a life of virtue and therefore arguing for a harmony of the two jurisdiction, CHURCH and STATE in the Christian polity Felicity on the earth would lead to happiness in heaven.

Aquinas' theory of the state enabled subsequent western political thought to move in the direction of conceptualising a secular state based on rationality and autonomy. The subsequent 14th Century carried Aquinas' argument to its logical end by developing the ideas of a secular liberal order, rudimentary ideas of representation and outlines of the present day constitutional framework in the representative writings of Marsilio of Padua and William of Ockham

Q4. Analyse Machiavelli's thoughts on politics and forms of government.

Ans.

Out of his two most important works, the "Prince" is an analysis of the political system of a strong monarchy while the "Discourses on Livius" of a strong republic. In the first one, the main theme is the successful creation of a principality by an individual, in the other it is the creation of an empire of free citizens. But in both, the centre of his thought is the method of those who wield the power of the state rather than the fundamental relationship in which the essence of the state exists. He viewed things from the standpoint of the ruler and not the ruled, Preservation of the state rather than the excellence of its constitution were his main consideration. He writes of the mechanisms of the governments by which the state can be made strong and the politics that can expand their powers. He points out the errors that bring about their downfall too. In the words of Sabine: "The purpose of politics is to preserve and increase political power itself, and the standard by which he judges it is its success in doing this. He often discusses the advantage of immorality skillfully used to gain a ruler's ends, and it is this

which is mainly responsible for his evil repute. But for the most part he is not so much immoral as non-moral." A thing which would be immoral for an individual to do, might, if necessary, in interest of the state, be justifiably done by a ruler or a monarch. His indifference towards morality, therefore, can be explained in terms of political expediency.

Machiavelli based liis thought on two premises. First, on the ancient Greek assumption that the state is the highest form of human association necessary for tlie protection, welfare and perfection of humanity and as such tlie interests of the state are definitely superior to individual or social interests. The second premise was that tlie self-interest in one form or another, particularly material self-interest, is the most potent of all factors of political motivation. Hence, the art of statecraft consists of the cold calculations of elements of self-interests in any given situation and the intelligent use of the practical means to meet the conflicting interests. Both these premises are reflected in his two books.

MACHIAVELLI'S CLASSIFICATION OF FORMS OF GOVERNMENT

Machiavelli's classification of the forms of government is rather unsystematic. The treatment of government in his two major works is significantly different; rather inconsistent and contradictory to each other. The 'Prince' deals with monarchies or absolute governments, while tlie 'Discourses' showed his admiration for expanded Roman Republic. There was nothing in Machiavelli's account of the absolute monarchy corresponding to his obviously sincere enthusiasm for the liberty and self-government of Roman Republic. In both forms his emphasis is on the cardinal principle of the preservation of the state as distinct from its foundlings, depends upon the excellence of its law, for this is the source of all civic virtues of its citizens. Even in a monarchy the prime condition of stable government is that it should be regulated by law. Thus, Machiavelli insisted upon the need for legal remedies against official abuses in order to prevent illegal violence. We pointed out the political danger of lawlessness in rulers and folly of vexations and harassing policies.

Both the books show equally the qualities for which Machiavelli has been specially known, such as, indifference to tlie use of immoral means for political purpose and belief that governments depend largely on force and craft. Machiavelli never erected his belief in the omnipotent law giver into a general theory of absolutism. However, what does not appear in the 'Prince' is his genuine enthusiasm for popular government of the sort exemplified in tlie Roman Republic, but which he believed to be impractical in Italy when lie wrote. Both the books present aspects of the same subject—the cause of the rise and decline of states and the means by which statesmen could make them permanent. This corresponds to twofold classification of states or form of government. The stability and preservation of the state is the prime objective of the ruler. Machiavelli favoured a gentle rule where ever possible and the use of severity only in moderation. He believed explicitly that government is more stable where it is shared by many. He preferred election to heredity as a mode of choosing rulers. He also spoke for general freedom to propose measures for the public good and for liberty of discussion before reaching a decision. He, in his 'Discourses' expressed that people must be independent and strong, because there is no way to make them suitable without giving them the means of rebellion. He had a high opinion both of the virtue and the judgement of an uncorrupted people as compared to those of the prince. These observations only show the conflicting and contradictory ideas of Machiavelli's philosophy; on one hand he advocates an absolute monarchy and on the other shows his admiration for a republic. As Sabine remarks: "His judgement was swayed by two admirations—for the resourceful despot and for the free, self-governing people—which were not consistent. He patched the two together, rather precariously, as the theories respectively of founding a state and of preserving it after it is founded. In more modern terms it might be said that he had *one theory for revolution and another for government.*" Obviously, he recommended despotism mainly for reforming a corrupt state and preserving its security. However, he believed, that state can be made permanent only if the people are admitted to some share in the government arid if the prince conducts the ordinary business of the state in accordance with law and with a due regard for the property and rights of his subjects. Despotic violence is a powerful political medicine, needed in corrupt states and for special contingencies, but it is still a poison which must be used with the greatest caution.

Q5. Discuss in brief Locke's political theory.

Ans. John Locke (1632-1704) is recognized as a captivating persona in the history of political philosophy whose intelligence of exposition and scale of scholarly activity had profound influence on the development of political thought John Locke was an English philosopher and physician, generally regarded as one of the most persuasive of Enlightenment intellectuals and usually identified as the "Father of Liberalism" It can be said that liberalism as a political thought initiated with John Locke No political thinker had influenced political theorizing on two different countries in two different continents as Locke did He was the controlling and spiritual predecessor of the 18th century enlightenment period, particularly for philosopher like Rousseau and Voltaire He was accredited as the originator of modern empiricism with Hume, J S Mill, Russel as its exponents He is equally important to social contract theory His work greatly impacted the development of epistemology and political thinking His writings influenced Voltaire and Rousseau, many Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, as well as the American insurgents His contributions to classical republicanism and liberal theory are echoed in the United States Declaration of Independence

Locke anticipated a deep-seated conception of political philosophy construed from the principle of self-ownership and the corollary right to own property, which in turn is based on his famous assertion that a man earns ownership over a resource when he mixes his labour with it He argued that government should be limited to securing the life and property of its citizens, and is only necessary because in an ideal, anarchic state of nature, various problems rise that would make life more uncertain than under the protection of a minimal state Locke is also renowned for his writings on toleration in which he adopted the right to freedom of conscience and religion, and for his forceful criticism of hereditary monarchy and patriarchalism. After his death, his mature political philosophy leant support to the British Whig party and its principles, to the Age of Enlightenment, and to the development of the separation of the State and Church in the American Constitution as well as to the rise of human rights theories in the Twentieth Century

It is well identified that Locke exercised a deep influence on political philosophy, in particular on modern liberalism. Michael Zuckert has contended that Locke launched liberalism by moderating Hobbesian absolutism and evidently separating the monarchies of Church and State He had a strong influence on Voltaire who called him "le sage Locke" His arguments concerning liberty and the social contract later influenced the written works of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and other Founding Fathers of the United States But Locke's influence may have been even more reflective in the realm of epistemology Locke redefined subjectivity, or self, and intellectual historians such as Charles Taylor and Jerrold Seigel argue that Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) marks the commencement of the modern Western conception of the self

For Locke, all knowledge comes exclusively through experience Locke's theory of mind is often mentioned as the basis of modern ideas of identity and the self, figuring conspicuously in the work of later philosophers such as Hume, Rousseau, and Kant Locke was the first to define the self through a continuity of consciousness He assumed that, at birth, the mind was a blank slate or tabula rasa Conflicting to Cartesian philosophy based on pre-existing concepts, he sustained that people are born without innate ideas, and that knowledge is instead determined only by experience derived from sense perception He argued that humans fill with ideas as they experience the world through the five senses Locke described knowledge as the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of the ideas humans form. This description clearly indicates that our knowledge does not extend beyond the scope of human ideas In fact, it would mean that our knowledge is even narrower than this description implies, because the connection between most simple human ideas is unknown Because ideas are limited by experience, and we cannot possibly experience everything that exists in the world, our knowledge is further compromised Nevertheless, Locke proclaimed that though our knowledge is necessarily limited in these ways, we can still be certain of some things For example, we have an intuitive and immediate knowledge of our own existence, even if we are unaware of the metaphysical essence of our souls We also have a demonstrative knowledge of God's existence, though our understanding cannot fully comprehend who or what he is We know other things

through sensation. We know that our ideas correspond to external realities because the mind cannot invent such things without experience

Locke begins by developing the idea of equality of human beings in the state of nature and their natural rights to life, liberty and the state of property Following this description of the individual, he develops notions of the community and the civil society Locke states that Government is based on the consent of the people and that legitimate government is limited, constituted by separation of powers To describe the origin of political power, Locke elaborated the State of Nature Locke's description of State of Nature was not as miserable and pessimistic as Hobbes' It is well established that the State of Nature is the stock in trade of all contract theories of the state It is conceived as a state prior to the establishment of political society Locke considered that man is a rational and social creature and as such capable of identifying and living in a moral order He is not selfish, competitive and aggressive

The Lockean state of nature, far from being a war of all is a state of 'Peace good will, mutual assistance and preservation" It signifies a pre-political rather than a pre-social condition. Men do not indulge in constant warfare in it, for peace and reason overcome in it The state of nature is governed by a law of nature Thus law "obliges every one, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm one another in his life, health, liberty or possessions for men being all the workmanship of one almighty and infinitely wise maker All the servants of sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his business, they are his property whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another's pleasure "

SECTION –II

Write a short note on each part of the question in about 250 words.

Q6. (a) Rousseau on civil society and social contract

Ans.

The themes introduced in his prize winning essay were developed further in his second essay written in 1754 on "what is the origin of inequality among men, and is it authorised by natural law?" The second Discourse, as this essay is called, is a narrative of the fall of man—how his nature got twisted, warped and corrupted with the emergence of civil society, which in turn was necessitated by the rise of the institution of private property and the need to defend it by institutionalising social inequality through 'law'. Here, Rousseau is extolling the 'natural man' and pouring scorn over the so-called 'civilised men'. The problem evidently was not with man, but the nature of society in which he was living.

Tracing the fall, Rousseau says that in the state of nature, which is a condition prior to the emergence of society, man was a 'noble savage'; lived in isolation and had a few elementary, easily appeased needs. It was neither a condition of plenty nor scarcity; neither there was conflict nor cooperative living There was no language or knowledge of any science or art. In such a situation man was neither happy nor unhappy, had no conception of just and unjust, virtue and vice. The noble savage was guided not by reason but by two instincts—self love or the instinct of self-preservation, and sympathy or the gregarious instinct.

The state of nature, which was one of innocence, did not last forever. In course of time, the noble savage who lived in isolation discovered the utility and usefulness of labor. Without yet having given up their primitive dispersal, men began to collaborate occasionally and created a degree of provisional order. Later men began to build shelters for themselves and families stayed ,together—a stage Rousseau calls the patriarchal stage. But as he consolidated his first social relations, he gave himself to labor and to thought, i.e, to the use of reason and language. This brought in the first fall for man, wrenching him from the happiness of the 'patriarchal stage' even as the discovery of division of labor, enabled men to pass from a subsistence economy to an economy of productive development. The emergence of metallurgy and agriculture was indeed a great revolution, But iron and corn, which civilised men, ruined humanity.

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The cultivation of earth led to the enclosure of land, and this necessarily gave rise to the idea of property, As Rousseau puts it in a famous statement: "The first man who after fencing off a piece of land, took it upon himself to say "This belongs to me" and found people simple-minded enough to believe, was the true founder of the civil society".
Once men began to claim possessions, the inequality of men's talents and skills led to an inequality of fortunes. Wealth enabled some men to enslave other's; the very idea of possession excited men's passions, and provoked competition and conflict.

Conflict led in turn to a demand for a system of law for sake of order and tranquility. The rich especially voiced this demand, for while the state of violence threatened everyone's life it was 'worse for the rich because it threatened their possessions also. Hence the expedient of a 'social contract' was thought of by a rich man to the detriment of the poor.

The result, says Rousseau, was the origin of civil society and laws, which gave new fetters to the poor, and new powers to the rich; which destroyed natural liberty for ever, fixed for all the law of property and inequality, transformed shrewd usurpation into settled right, and to benefit a few ambitious persons, subjected the whole of human race thenceforth to labor, servitude and wretchedness.

Rousseau suggests however, that things need not have turned out as badly as they had. If, with the establishment of the government, men, 'ran headlong into chains', that was because men had the sense to see the advantages of political institutions, but not the experience to foresee the dangers. To this theme Rousseau was to return some years later in the *Social Contract*.

It may however be noted here that Rousseau was not depicting the transition from state of nature to 'civil society' as a historical fact. Rather the above account has to be understood as hypothetical reasoning calculated to explain the nature of things, than to ascertain their actual origin.

Though Rousseau critiqued 'civil society', he did not suggest man to choose the savage existence, as some of his contemporaries mistook him. In fact Voltaire even ridiculed Rousseau for wanting us to walk on all four. In the *Discourse* itself, Rousseau exclaims: "What then is to be done? Must societies be totally abolished? Must meum and tuum be annihilated, and must we return again to the forests to live among bears? This is a deduction in the manner of my adversaries, which I would as soon anticipate and let them have the shame of drawing."

There was thus no going back to the state of nature. For Rousseau society was inevitable, without which man could not fulfill him or realise his native potentials. If he was critiquing civil society it was because it was not founded on just principles and had corrupting influence. The task therefore was to create a new social order that would help man realise his true nature.

To such a task Rousseau devoted himself in Social Contract. The key to the construction of the ideal social-political order was to handle the problem of political obligation, namely, why should man obey the state through a proper reconciliation of authority with freedom, as it ought to be—a task which, according to Rousseau, was unsatisfactorily and inadequately done by his predecessor philosophers.

Social Contract opens dramatically, "Man is born free, and he is everywhere in chains". His purpose is how to make the chains legitimate in place of the illegitimate chains of the contemporary society. With such a purpose, Rousseau's theoretical problem is: "To find a form of association capable of defending and protecting with the total common force, the person and the property of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before", through a social contract.

The social contract involves: "the total alienation of each associate, together with all his rights, to the whole community." Each man gives himself to all, he gives himself to nobody in particular: "As there is no associate over whom he does not acquire the same right as he yields over himself, he gains an equivalent for everything he loses, and an increase of force for the preservation of what he has." Reduced to its essence, the participants of the social contract agree amongst themselves that: "each of us puts his person and all his power to the common use under the supreme direction of the General Will; and as a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole".

As a result of the contract, the private person ceases to exist for the contract produces a moral and collective Body, which receives from the same act its unity, its common identity, its life and its will. This public person formed from the union of all particular individuals is the State when it is passive; the Sovereign when it is active; a Power, when compared with similar institutions.

After the institution of a state, Rousseau visualises a great transformation in the human being. It substitutes in his conduct a rule of justice for the rule of instinct and gives to his action a moral character which theretofore he had lacked. Rousseau goes to the extent of saying that he is transformed from a stupid and limited animal into an intelligent creature and man.

But such a transformation would be fantastic, quite improbable, if the contract is conceived as a single, specific occurrence. But for Rousseau, the contract is not a single event, but a way of thinking. Thus conceived, contract becomes a process and we can think of alteration of human nature as also being gradual and not instantaneous. Here we have a conception of man whose moral sensibilities and intellectual prowess gradually evolves and develops *pari passu* with the widening and deepening of man's social relations brought about by a continuous participation in the General Will.

(b) Edmund Burke on democracy and religion

Ans.

Burke was also perturbed by the democratic aspirations of the French revolution, in particular by the doctrines of popular sovereignty and general will. He regarded democracy as the "most shameless thing in the world" (Burke 1969: 190). He was skeptical of the political ability of the ordinary people. He was an elitist, totally unconcerned about the plight of the masses. For him, the best form of political practice was one that was played by a few of the enlightened and aristocratic elite. Burke believed that elections gave an opportunity for the enfranchised citizens to choose a wise elite to govern them. In a modified form, Schumpeter provided a similar model of elitist theory of democracy in the 1940s. Like Aristotle, Burke favoured citizenship limited to a segment of adults who had the leisure for discussion and information, and were not mentally dependent. The Whigs in England and America favoured ownership of property as a necessary condition for citizenship. In view of the fact that average individuals were guided by their baser instincts, government had to keep them apathetic so as to prevent their selfishness from undermining communal life.

Burke accepted inequalities as natural and unavoidable in any society, and that some would enjoy an enhanced status. In the well-ordered society, this ruling elite was a genuine one, a 'natural aristocracy', for the mass of people were incapable of governing themselves. They could not think or act without guidance and direction. For Burke, government was not based on general will, but wisdom. For Burke, political representation "is the representation of interests and interest has an objective, impersonal and unattached reality" (Pitkin 1967: 10). For Burke, aristocracy of virtue and wisdom should govern for the good of a nation. As in other areas, even in representation, there was no clear and well laid out theory of representation. But out of Burke's speeches and writings emerged some key ideas. He regarded the members of parliament as an elite group, a group of natural aristocracy. The mass of ordinary people needed the guidance and direction from this elite since they could not govern by themselves. Representatives were genuinely superior to the electorate. The representatives had to possess the capacity for rational decision making. They were to be men of practical wisdom. This was a negation of Jean Jacques Rousseau's (1712-78) theory of direct democracy. The representatives need not consult or be bound by the views of the voters. Furthermore, obligation and ethical considerations, and questions of right and wrong guided governmental action. Burke championed rational parliamentary discussion, which provided the right answers to political questions. And as a participant, the representative need not consult the voters. They would enjoy complete freedom, for they have no interest other than the national interest. With contempt for the average voter, Burke advocated restricted suffrage so that the selection process of the natural aristocratic group of parliament would become fool proof. He also distinguished between *actual representation* and ~~virtual~~ *representation*. Since an area would have one dominant interest, he saw the merit of virtual representation against actual representation. Virtual representation was based on common interest. By this logic, even people who did not vote were represented. The localities, which did not have actual representation by this criterion, would have virtual representation. Burke was careful in noting that this logic of virtual representation did not hold for the disenfranchised Catholics of Ireland and the people of the American colonies. Pitkin (1967: 169-70) rightly pointed out that Burke's position was highly inconsistent. His view of representation endorsed the 17th Century notion of representation, and had very little relevance in contemporary times. However, it helps us to understand the anti-democratic bias prevalent during Burke's period. The Burkean theory centred on the parliament. Conniff (1977: 331-332) tried to refute Pitkin's analysis by questioning the theory of objective interest and a commonly held agreement of the parliamentary elite on what constituted the common good. However, Burke's insistence that every recognisable constituency had one dominant interest and that a consensus could always emerge out of parliamentary discussion vindicated Pitkin.

Religion

Burke's views on religion exhibited both liberal and conservative perceptions. He defended traditional practices of the established church, unless there was an 'intolerable abuse'. He equated attack on the established Church of England as tantamount to an attack on England's constitutional order. He was convinced that the established church would foster peace and

dissuade civil discord. His liberal temperament made him advocate and defend toleration for most religious sects, including non-Christians. He was perturbed that the Protestants did not support toleration for the Catholics. He did not believe in the truth of any particular religion but was concerned about the effect of changes in traditional religious practice on political stability. Toleration and religious freedom could be refused if it threatened civil peace and considered atheism as complementary to political radicalism. He was condescending towards Rational Dissenters as being better than atheists, for at least they believed in God, though not in the divinity of Christ. However, he castigated all those who corrupted and attacked religion as being destructive of all authority, thereby undermining equity, justice, and order—the foundations of human society.

Burke did not quarrel with the atheists as long as they did nothing to publicly attack or subvert religion. While he began to dislike Hume for his open contempt of religion, he remained friendly with the irreligious Smith, even though the latter blamed Roman Catholicism for impeding economic and political progress, but there was no denunciation or revolt against religion. Burke's critique of the French Revolution was also due to the latter's anti-clericalism. The famous cry "hang the bishops from the lampposts" during the early days of the Revolution was an indication of the "insolent irreligious in opinions and practices". The nationalisation of the Church's property by the National Assembly in 1790 was a move against traditional religion, and represented the larger goal of subverting establishing authority and civil society. The revolutionary fervour only fostered hatred, animosity and suspicion, rather than affection and trust. It undermined the traditional civilising ties of the French citizens. Burke placed a great deal of emphasis on manners and etiquette that controlled passions and will.

Q7. (a) Immanuel Kant's political philosophy

Ans.

A distinctive feature of Kant's political philosophy is its cosmopolitanism, globalism or internationalism. He does not separate domestic politics from international politics. Paying tribute to the cosmopolitan character of Kant's political philosophy, Wolfgang Kersting writes:

> While Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau were satisfied with overcoming the interpersonal natural condition and allowed the authority of political philosophy to end at the border of the state, Kant took political philosophy beyond the borders of states and saw its foremost object in the "highest political good" ... of a just order of world peace.

Kant believed that for achieving this "highest political good,' namely, perpetual peace among the nations/states of the world, we have to overcome not only the "natural condition" (or "state of nature") among individuals within nations or states but also the "natural condition" of anarchy or war-proneness among the states. In fact, he saw these two levels of natural condition to be interrelated.

He maintained that the universal principle of right/justice has to govern not only domestic politics but also international politics. He writes:

> Moral-practical reason within us pronounces the following irresistible veto: There shall be no war, either between individual human beings in the state of nature, or between separate states, which, although internally law-governed, still live in a lawless condition in their external relationships with one another. For war is not the way in which anyone should pursue his rights... It can indeed be said that this task of establishing a universal and lasting peace is not just a part of the theory of right within the limits of pure reason, but its entire ultimate purpose.
>
> Kant disapproved of the reduction of global politics to international diplomatic relations of governments. He called for re-conceptualising international society as the global society of mankind.

Kant did admit that there is a distinction between domestic laws and the Law of Nations in that the latter, unlike the former, is concerned both with the relationship of one state to another and with "relationships of individuals in one state to individuals in another and of an individual to another whole state."

According to Kant, as we saw above, what raises the human being above the animal world is one's capacity for action in accordance with the principles of moral-practical reason. This means that man "is not to be valued merely as a means to the ends of other people, or even to his own ends, but is to be prized as an end in himself'. Hence, when principles of political justice are grounded in moral-practical reason, they will help prevent wars, in which there is the most blatant use of human beings as means to the ends of others. The autonomy principle of moral-practical reason, says Kant, also calls for a "republican" form of government, under which the citizens will not be treated as the mere tools of the sovereigns.

Kant argues that the enlightened or rational individuals know that the hardships of war fall on them, rather than on their rulers, who, in fact, tend to gain from conflicts and wars. He assumes that all the citizens of all the countries have a common interest in international peace, while the ruling cliques or regimes tend to have an interest in international conflicts and wars. In his view, therefore, the democratisation or republicanisation of governments can contribute to international peace. Since wars bring more dangers and hardships to the ordinary citizens than to their rulers, republican/democratic governments would find it difficult to decide to go to war.

In his essay, *Perpetual* Peace (1795), he wrote that in the interest of perpetual peace, all the nation-states should agree to be guided by three "definitive articles" of peace, namely, i) the states should adopt republican constitutions; ii) republican states should form a "pacific union" or confederation for the prevention of wars; iii) the "pacific union" should make and put into practice a cosmopolitan law to ensure "universal hospitality" towards foreigners and to prevent foreign conquests and plunder.

(b) Jeremy Bentham and utilitarian principles

Ans.

Bentham began the first chapter of *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* thus: "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The principle of utility recognises this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law." (p.11)

For Bentham, utilitarianism was both a descriptive and normative theory—it not only described how human beings act so as to maximise pleasure and minimise pain, but it also prescribed or advocated such action. According to the principle of utility (or the greatest happiness principle, or the felicity principle) the cause of all human action, that which motivates human beings to act, is a desire for pleasure. Utility or happiness is defined in terms of pleasure: a thing/action is useful if it brings about happiness, that is, pleasure: "By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or happiness." A person's interest also has the same content—that of pleasure—"something is in the interest of a person when it tends to add to the sum total of his pleasures or diminish the sum total of his pains." (p.12)

In The Principles, Bentham listed fourteen kinds of simple pleasures that move human beings—including the pleasures of sense, wealth, skill, power, benevolence and malevolence. Diminishing pain also means more pleasure—there are twelve kinds of pain which individuals seek to avoid—for instance, the pains of the senses, or of an ill name.

Not only do individuals behave in this manner, but they use the evaluative terms of good and bad to name those activities which bring them pleasure or pain. Now this is a position as old as Hobbes. What is new with Bentham and his claim of utilitarianism being a moral theory is the advocacy of such action. What brings about pleasure is morally good, that which leads to pain *is* evil and should be avoided. (emphasis added) Human welfare can only be furthered if individuals maximise pleasure and minimise pain. As early as 1776, in the Preface to the *Fragment*, Bentham had written: "It is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong."

What is so moral about an individual seeking his pleasure? Bentham's answer to the charge of utilitarianism being, instead of a theory of morality, a theory actually of selfish psychological hedonism is that utilitarianism does not propose that one seek only one's own pleasure. In deciding whether to act in a particular manner, one has to be impartial between one's own pleasure and that of all those affected by that act. "...if all happiness is either the happiness of the agent himself or the happiness of others", (quoted in Parekh, p. 91), then we can clearly show that utilitarianism is concerned with the happiness of others. Let us take the example of punishment—if punishment is to have some utility, and to have utility is to generate happiness, then punishment is obviously not going to make the person who is being punished happy. It will instead make others happy by making it less probable that the crime is committed again. It is true that for Bentham the community is a 'fictitious' entity—nothing more than individual members constituting it. "The interest of the community then is...the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it." (The *Principles*, p.12) It remains true, however, that the interests (happiness) of others are to count as much as the interest of oneself.

The context of one's action determines the circle of individuals affected by it. For government officials, all the members of their state are affected by their action, so the government has to calculate the balance of pleasure and pain on a country wide scale. A private individual has to consider only the pleasures and pains of those few directly affected by his action. Thus the government is concerned about the happiness or welfare of all its citizens, and the individual is to think of the happiness of other persons apart from himself—that is then, what makes utilitarianism a moral theory.

Bentham identified four general motives for human action. The purely social motive of benevolence moves only a few individuals. Such benevolent individuals pursue the happiness of others even at the cost of their own happiness. An individual acting out of the semi-social motive of love of reputation or praise, pursues others' happiness only when it promotes his own as well. The majority of humankind act out of the asocial motive of self interest, when one's own happiness is pursued, taking care not to cause others pain but not pursuing their happiness either. Finally, there are some individuals moved by dissocial motives, who actually experience pleasure by harming others.

Bentham also provided a calculus for determining the balance between pleasure and pain from any action. According to this felicific calculus, one must give a numerical value to the intensity, duration, certainty or uncertainty, and propinquity or remoteness, (The *Principles*, p.38) of the pleasures and pains of the persons affected by one's actions, and one must undertake the action only if the value of the pleasure is higher than the value of the pain. One should also factor *in* the fecundity of the pleasure producing act, as well as the purity and extent of the pleasure being produced. In calculating pleasure and pain, one must be careful to abstract both from the object which is the source of the pleasure/pain, as well as from the person whose pleasure/pain is being calculated. This means that the pleasures every one is to count as one, and the pleasure from a worthwhile activity like writing a history of Egypt is not by definition of higher value than that from gambling with a deck of cards.

Human beings seek happiness, their own and that of others. They ought to seek happiness, their own and of others. To seek, however, is one thing; the question is, how can they attain what they seek. What is required, in general, for human beings to reach the happiness they are searching for? Human happiness, for Bentham, depended on the services men rendered to each other. Government can ensure these services by creating a system of rights and obligations. Political society exists because government is necessary to compel individuals to render services to each other to increase their happiness—this then is how Bentham made the transition from his utilitarianism to his political philosophy.

Q8. (a) Alexis de Tocqueville on religion

Ans.

The 16th Century as exemplified in the writings of Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) is acknowledged to be the beginning of secular politics in Europe. Machiavelli though anti-Church and anti-clergy considered religion as necessary for individual's social life and for the health and prosperity of the state. Religion along with good laws and a well-disciplined citizen militia would produce order, which in turn brings forth peace, fortune and success. As a social force, religion played a pivotal rote for through its doctrine of rewards and punishment it induced proper behaviour and good conduct that was necessary for the wellbeing of society. While Machiavelli understood that religion was socially useful he could not comprehend its intrinsic link with liberty, a theme that Tocqueville succinctly developed in opposition to the mainstream Enlightenment credo to uphold reason and liberty by being anti religion.,

The striking originality of Tocqueville lies in recognising the extraordinary importance religion played in strengthening democracy in America. He considered religion as a 'political institution' and vital to the preservation of freedom in a democratic society particularly from the despotic tendencies that equality of conditions unleashed. He observed: "despotism may govern without religion... liberty cannot". Democracy, because of equality of conditions needed moral lies and hence needed religion. He pointed to the utility of religion rather than the truth of any one religion. This extraordinary emphasis on religion was because he regarded it to be crucial to establishing democracy in France and other Christian states of Europe. He concluded that due to the variance between "the spirit of religion" and "the spirit of freedom" democracy failed in Europe. The alliance between the Catholic Church and the French monarchy, although injurious to religion in itself, was characteristic of a more calamitous alliance between Christianity and the moribund aristocracy. The Church considered democracy to be antithetical to religion and consequently an enemy. In America the two were closely linked which explained the success of democracy there.

America, the nascent Puritan commonwealth rejected Europe's aristocratic heritage and accepted the principles of democracy. The Puritans brought to the New World a Christianity that was democratic, constitutional and republican. They introduced such principles as the participation by the people to rule, the free voting in matters of taxation, fixing the responsibility of political representatives, guarding personal liberty and trial by jury. They instilled a love of freedom anchored in religious conviction by teaching Americans that their freedom is a gift from God and therefore had to be taken seriously and used wisely. Christianity associated itself with the principles of liberal democracy that it initiated to create, and hence could hope for an autonomous space that was both enduring and timeless.

Historically, for Tocqueville democracy began when Jesus unequivocally proclaimed universal human equality thereby making the realisation of democracy possible. Furthermore the Christian teaching that was important for a democratic society was the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Religion taught human beings to strive for eternal happiness by resisting "the selfish

passions of the hour" and thus democratic individuals would learn that only through persistence and hard work something permanent could be attained in both private and public spheres. They acquired the art of managing their life. By believing in "supersensual and immortal principles" they learnt to focus on the spiritual rather than the base and thus develop an instinctive love for liberty. At a first glance it appeared that religion was divorced from American politics. The clergy restricted their sovereignty to religious matters and did not criticise the fundamental principles of the republic. However, in reality they actively promoted them. Tocqueville felt that if Christianity did not exercise such self-restraint then it ran the risk of not getting marginalised American clergy not only accepted the supreme authority of self-interest but also enlisted the selfish passion for the service of religion. They showed in their congregations that Christian virtues were compatible with freedom and prosperity as well as salvation thus bringing both the head and heart to the altar. Furthermore, the dictum "the things that are Caesar's" and "the things that are not Caesar's" made it mandatory that no political or military authority could enjoy complete authority over human beings. This was the primary reason for the end of European feudalism.

Tocqueville, though himself a practicing Catholic, acknowledged, like Max Weber (1864-1920) later, that the Protestant Ethic encouraged individualism and freedom but with proper respect for political authority. With greater social equality and the support of the middle class, this spirit extended to democracy. The combination of all these factors led to the American success with a harmonious evolution of both Christianity and de-nocracyn America. Interestingly, this unique achievement of America has been made possible by realising the principle of separation of the Church and the state. This has prevented the consolidation of vested religious interests' in particular political parties and groups as has happened in Europe. In America there was a harmonious coexistence of religion and democracy. In fact, democracy facilitates the spread of religion by guaranteeing the right of religious beliefs. All religious faiths gained by political liberty and consequently religion also supports the separation of state and Church.

Besides religion the second important factor conducive for democracy in America was equality of conditions. Interestingly, this attribute by itself did not lead to freedom and was compatible with a new kind of despotism made possible by the forces of individualism and materialism that democracy unleashed. While old aristocracies with its hierarchical class structures allowed people to forge firm and lasting political ties democracies with its doctrine of equality loosened those bonds. Large number of human beings became economically independent and as a result wrongly assumed that they had complete control of their destinies. This false sense of independence changed the sentiments of obligation that aristocracy fostered into radical self-interest.

Religion emerged as the savior of democracy by checking this degeneration. Tocqueville conceded that religion might not be able to contain the entire urge of individualism and the pursuit of well being, but was the only mechanism of moderation and education He saw religion sustaining moderate individualism with drive for material prosperity, both of which were essential For the success of democracy. Instead of seeing religion as an antithesis of human liberation as Karl Heinrich Marx (1818-83) did, Tocqueville felt a happy blending of democracy and religion was possible and desirable.

Tocqueville was categorical that democracy did not rest on either constitutional arrangements or laws but on mores of society, which embraced both habits and opinions made possible by religion for it inculcated moral habits, with respect for all human beings. This was necessary in a free society in the absence of political control. This was the essence of the success of American religion. In contrast in Europe the champions of human freedom attacked religious

opinions not realising that without religious faith despotism was inevitable and liberty unrealizable. The lack of self-restraint due to destruction of faith led to the reign of terror after the French Revolution. In the absence of religion, atheism and tyranny would be the fate of all modern democracies.

A successful political democracy has to be grounded on moral institutions, which means religious faith. The dynamics of the democratic process and its interaction with society at large minimises theological considerations and the otherworldly attitude that religion fosters. The adaptation to democratic life means religion would have to accept the philosophies of well being and prosperity. In return religion purifies and regulates by emphasising honest means to reach these ends. The greatest advantage of religion is moderation and self-control. The fine balance of democracy and religion and its uninterrupted success in America contrasted with the stark failure of irreligious communism gives credence to Tocqueville's analysis.

(b) John Stuart Mill on rights for women

Ans.

The *Subjection of Women* (1869) begins with the revolutionary statement, "the principle which regulates the existing social relations between the two sexes—the legal subordination of one sex to the other—is wrong in itself, and now one of the chief hindrances to human improvement; and... it ought to be replaced by a principle of perfect equality," (p. 119) Mill's referent for the legal subordination of women was the mid 19th Century English law of the marriage contract. By this law, married Englishwomen could hold no property in their own name, and even if their parents gifted them any property that too belonged to their husbands. Unless a woman was legally separated from her husband, (a difficult and expensive process) even if she lived away from him, her earnings belonged officially to him. By law, only the father and not the mother was the guardian of a couple's children. Mill also cited the absence of laws on marital rape to prove the inequality suffered by the Englishwomen of that time.

The first argument for women's inequality which Mill refuted was that since historically it has been a universal practice, therefore there must be some justification for it. Contra this, Mill showed that other so called universal social practices like slavery, for example, had been rejected, so perhaps given time women's inequality would also become unacceptable. Mill also said that from the existence of something, one could argue for the rightness of that thing, only if the alternative has been tried, and in the case of women, living with them on equal terms had never been done. The reason why women's inequality had survived slavery and political absolutism was not because it was justifiable, but because whereas only slave holders and despots had an interest in holding on to slavery and despotism, all men, Mill argued, had an interest in women's subordination.

A second argument for women's inequality was based on women's nature—women were said to be naturally inferior to men. Mill's response was that one could not make arguments about women's inequality based on natural differences because these differences were a result of socialisation. Mill was generally against using human nature as a ground for any claim, since he believed that human nature changed according to the social environment. At the same time, Mill also pointed out that in spite of being treated so differently from men, many women throughout history had shown an extraordinary aptitude for political leadership—here Mill cited examples of European queens and Hindu princesses

The third argument refuted by Mill was that there is nothing wrong with women's subordination because women accept it voluntarily. Mill pointed out that this claim was empirically wrong—many women had written tracts against women's inequality and hundreds of women were already demonstrating in the streets of London for women's suffrage. Further, since women had no choice but to live with their husbands, they were afraid that their complaints about their position would only lead to worse treatment from them. Lastly, Mill also claimed that since all

women were brought up from childhood to believe—"that their ideal of character is the very opposite to that of men; not self-will, and government by self-control, but submission, and yielding to the control of others," (p. 132)—what was not to be remarked was that some women accepted this subordination willingly but that so many women resisted it.

The last point against which Mill argued was that for a family to function well, one decision maker is needed, and the husband is best suited to be this decision maker. Mill scoffed at this argument—the husband and wife being both adults, there was no reason why the husband should take all the decisions

Having refuted all of these four arguments for women's inequality, Mill wrote: "There are many persons for whom it is not enough that the inequality has no just or legitimate defence; they require to be told what express advantage would be obtained by abolishing it." (p. 196) The question was, would society benefit if women were granted equal rights. Answering in the affirmative, Mill detailed four social benefits of women's equality

The first advantage would be that the family would no longer be "a school of despotism".(p. 160) According to Mill, the patriarchal family teaches all its members how to live in hierarchical relationships, since all power is concentrated in the hands of the husband/father/master whom the wife/children/servants have to obey. For Mill such families are an anachronism in modern democratic polities based on the principle of equality. Individuals who live in such families cannot be good democratic citizens because they do not know how to treat another citizen as an equal: "Any sentiment of freedom which can exist in a man whose nearest and dearest intimacies are with those of whom he is absolute master, is not the genuine love of freedom, but, what the love of freedom generally was in the ancients and in the middle ages—an intense feeling of the dignity and importance of his own personality; making him disdain a yoke for himself,...but which he is abundantly ready to impose on others for his own interest or glorification." (p. 161) In the interests of democratic citizenship then, it was necessary to obtain equality for women in the family.

Another advantage, Mill pointed out, would be the "doubling of the mass of mental faculties" (p 199) available to society. Not only would society benefit because there would be more doctors, engineers, teachers, and scientists (all women); an additional advantage would be that men in the professions would perform better because of competition from their female colleagues.

Third, women enjoying equality will have a better influence on mankind, Under relations of subordination, women assert their wills only in all sorts of perverse ways; with equality, they will no longer need to do this

Finally, by giving women equal rights, their happiness would be increased manifold, and this would satisfy Mill argued, the utilitarian principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

Note some of Mill's conceptual moves—for instance, the link he established between the private and the public. Unlike other liberals, who not only saw the extant family as the realm of freedom, but since this freedom was mostly defined as arbitrariness, disassociated the family as irrelevant to larger public concerns of liberal democracy, Mill argued that without the reform of the patriarchal family, it would be impossible to firmly ground democracy. Note that he was not merely saying that without equal rights to women, the democratic project is incomplete, but that democracy in the political/public sphere will remain shaky unless we bring up or create democratic citizens in egalitarian families.

What still makes some feminists uncomfortable is that Mill insisted that patriarchal families are an anachronism in modern society: "[t]he social subordination of women thus stands out as an isolated fact in modern social institutions...a single relic of an old world of thought and practice..." (p. 137) Many feminists now talk about capitalist patriarchy—the reinforcing of patriarchal institutions by modern capitalism.

Q9. (a) John Stuart Mill on individual liberty

Ans.

On Liberty (1859) begins with a paradox—civil liberties are under greater threat in democratic than in despotic regimes, wrote Mill In the absolutist states of earlier times, the ruler's interest was seen as opposed to that of the subjects, who were specially vigilant against any encroachment on their existing freedoms. In modern democracies based on the principle of self government, the people feel less under threat from their own government. Mill berated this laxity and said that individuals needed to be more vigilant about the danger to their liberty not only from the government, but also from social morality and custom.

Why is it important to protect individual liberty? When individuals make their own choices, they use many of their faculties—"The human faculties of perception, judgement, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference, are exercised only in making a choice ..The mental and moral, like the muscular powers, are improved only by being used...He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and judgement to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision." (p.59) Individuals who act in a certain fashion only because they have been told to do so, do not develop any of these faculties. Emphasising that what is important is "not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are that do it", (p. 59) Mill said that we might be able to 'guide' individuals in 'some good path' without allowing them to make any choices, but the 'worth' of such human beings would be doubtful. .

Mill clarified and detailed his position on liberty by defending three specific liberties, the liberty of thought and expression including the liberty of speaking and publishing, the liberty of action and that of association. We will follow Mill's argument in each of these cases

Liberty of thought and expression: "If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind " (p. 20) Mill provided four reasons for this freedom of expression. For Mill, since the dominant ideas of a society usually emanate from the class interests of that society's ascendant class, the majority opinion may be quite far from the truth or from the social interest. It's more than likely that the suppressed minority opinion is true, and those suppressing it will only prevent or at least delay mankind from knowing the truth. Human beings are fallible creatures—and their certainty that the opinion they hold is true is justified only when their opinion is constantly opposed to contrary opinions. Mill wanted us to give up the assumption of infallibility—when our certainty about our beliefs makes us crush all contrary points of view so that our opinion is not subject to criticism.

What if the minority opinion were false? Mill gave three reasons for why it should still be allowed freedom of expression. It's only by constantly being able to refute wrong opinions, that we hold our correct opinions as living truths. If we accept an opinion, even if correct, on the basis of authority alone, that opinion becomes a dead dogma. Neither do we understand its grounds, and nor does it mould our character or move us to action. Finally Mill argued that truth is a multifaceted thing and usually contrary opinions both contain a part of the truth. Suppressing one opinion then, leads to the suppression of one part of the truth.

When it comes to the liberty of action, Mill asserted a very simple principle: "the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection...the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant " (p. 13) Mill

acknowledged that it was difficult to draw a line between self-regarding and other regarding action, and he provided some hypothetical examples as proof of this difficulty. If a man destroys his own property, this is a case of other regarding action because others dependent on that man will be affected. Even if this person has no dependants, his action can be said to affect others, who, influenced by his example, might behave in a similar manner.

Against this, Mill said that only when one has specific obligations to another person, can one be said to affect his or her interests; therefore the case of an individual affecting others by his example will not stand. On his own ground, Mill cited all kinds of restrictions on not eating pork or beef, or priests being required not to marry, as examples of unnecessary restrictions on self-regarding action. Other examples are Sabbatarian legislation which prevents individuals from working or even singing and dancing on Sundays.

Mill wrote that sometimes even in the case of other regarding action, no restrictions can be placed on one—for instance, if one wins a job through competition, this action can be said to affect others' interests by ensuring that they do not get the job, but no restrictions are applicable here. Similarly, trade has social consequences, but believing in the principle of free trade, Mill argued that lack of restrictions on trade actually leads to better pricing and better quality of products. And when it comes to self-regarding action, as we already showed, the principle of liberty requires the absence of all restrictions.

Mill defended freedom of association on three grounds. First, "when the thing to be done is likely to be done better by individuals than by government. Speaking generally, there is no one fit to conduct any business, or to determine how or by whom it shall be conducted, as those who are personally interested in it." (p. 109) Second, allowing individuals to get together to do something, even if they do not do it as well as the government might have done it, is better for the mental education of these individuals. The right of association becomes, for Mill, a "practical part of the political education of a free people, taking them out of the narrow circle of personal and family selfishness, and accustoming them to the comprehension of joint concerns—habituating them to act from public or semi-public motives, and guide their conduct by aims which unite instead of isolating them from one another." (pp. 109-110) Further, government operations tend to be everywhere alike; with individuals and voluntary associations, on the contrary, there are varied experiments, and endless diversity of experience. Third, if we let the government do everything, there is the evil of adding unnecessarily to its power.

Mill's ideal was improvement—he wanted individuals to constantly better themselves morally, mentally and materially. It was to this ideal that he saw individual liberty as instrumental: "The only unfailing and permanent source of improvement is liberty, since by it there are as many possible independent centres of improvement as there are individuals." (p. 70) Individuals improving themselves would naturally lead to a better and improved society.

(b) Hegel's philosophy of history

Ans.

Hegel's philosophy of history is contained in the lectures that he delivered while he was at the Berlin University. He does not attach much importance to the material things. He views them merely as the cumulative result of evolution of absolute Idea. Absolute Idea is dynamic and ever evolving. It moves forward in search of self-realisation. This is termed by Hegel as unfolding of *the reason*. The whole universe is the result of this process of unfolding of Reason. In fact, Hegel's philosophy of history is somewhat similar to the Christian theology, which sees history as a pattern of meaningful events which can be understood in terms of cosmic design. It is unfolding of reason under God's guidance or as willed by God. The Absolute Idea moves forward in an evolutionary process. In this evolutionary process the absolute Idea or the spirit takes many forms, discarding the earlier ones and getting newer ones. The first stage in this evolution is the physical or the inorganic world. At this initial stage the Absolute Idea (or Spirit) acquires the form of gross matter. The second stage in this process is the organic world: animals, plants etc. This stage is an improvement on the earlier stage. The third stage is the evolution of human beings. Each stage is more complicated than the previous stage. The evolution of human beings marks a qualitatively higher stage because the human beings are rational agents capable of distinguishing between good and bad. The fourth stage marks the evolution of family system. In addition to rational element it involves mutual cooperation and accommodation. The fifth stage marks the evolution of Civil Society. Here economic inter-dependence is the main feature in addition to mutual cooperation and accommodation. The last

and highest stage witnesses the evolution of the state, which represents a perfect moral order. Hegel argues that family symbolises unity; civil society symbolises particularity and the state syinbolises universality. The unity of the family, particularity of the civil society is realised with the appearance of the state as the actuality of the universal order. Both the family and civil society are to some degree rational but only the state is perfectly rational and perfectly ethical. In short, the evolutionary process passes through the following stages and each successive stage is a distinct improvement on the predecessor stages

Inorganic would - organic world - human beings - family - civil society - State

It should be noted that with the help of the above argument Hegel tried to solve the basic problem about the relationship between matter and Spirit. He did so by arguing that matter is only a manifestation of Spirit in its crude form. Matter is not only a negation of Spirit but also the conscious realisation of Spirit.

The second important dimension of Hegel's philosophy of history is the doctrine of historicism. It is difficult to explain this doctrine. Broadly speaking, historicism is a doctrine, which holds that the whole course of history is predetermined course. The human intervention or human effort can be effective only if it falls in line with the dialectical direction of the world history. Like the stoic God history leads the wise man and drags the fool.

The third major dimension of Hegel's philosophy of history is the use of Aristotelian teleology. According to it every thing in the world is moving towards the realisation of its end, its true nature. From the point of view of the human actors, history is a union of irony and tragedy; from the point of view of the Whole it is a cyclic. When we look at Hegel's philosophy of history in its totality we can say that it is an attempt to synthesise Kant's and Herder's philosophies of history. Kant advocated scientific understanding of history, while Herder emphasised the place of feelings and speculation. In this sense Hegel's philosophy of history is speculative reason. Let us elaborate this point.

For filler understanding of thrust of Hegel's philosophy of history you must understand that there is philosophical as against empirical history. The historians of latter category insist on accurate delineation of the facts which is their paramount concern. The former (philosophic historians) on the other hand are not satisfied with mere narration of facts and try to provide divination of the meaning and look for the exhibition of reason's working in the sphere of history. They do not feel satisfied by mere reproduction of empirical facts and try to incorporate their knowledge of the Idea, the articulation of reason. Thus they elevate empirical contents to the level of necessary truth.

For Hegel the world history exhibits the development of the consciousness of freedom on the part of Spirit. Hegel actually applies his philosophy of history when he says that in the oriental world (China etc) there was despotism and slavery and freedom was confined only to the monarch. But in Greek and Roman civilisations although slavery was there, yet the citizens enjoyed freedom. In Europe particularly in Germany there is emphasis on liberty for all and infinite worth of each individual is recognised. The world history thus consists of definite stages of progression—Oriental, Greek, Roman and Germanic. In short, Hegel's philosophy of history consists of two parts: (i) the general pattern and (ii) various stages in this general pattern. Finally, Hegel's philosophy of history talks of doctrine of moving forces in historical change. He argues that Reason's great design can be carried out with the help of human passions. Certain great men (like Caesar or Alexander) are chosen as instruments of destiny. Such men are necessary if the plot of history is to be carried out. This amounts to saying that ideas are important but there must be will power to implement them.

Q10. (a) Marx's vision of a communist society

Ans.

Communism is explained by Marx as a form of society which the proletariat will bring into existence through its t-evolutionary struggle. In Communist *Manifesto* Marx and Engels argued that the communists have no interests separate and apart from the interests of the proletariat as

a whole. In his *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* Marx defined communism as the positive abolition of private property. It also entailed the abolition of classes and abolition of division of labour. In economic terms the communist society will be a "society of associated producers". In political terms communism will be the first state in the history of mankind to use political power for universal interests instead of partisan interests. Thus, it will be different from the state in capitalism which is no more than the Managing Committee of the Bourgeoisie. For Marx the state in capitalism is serving the long-term interests of the bourgeoisie as a whole. It promotes and legitimises the exploitation of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie.

'In *Critique of the Gotha Programme* Marx talked of two stages of communist society. In the first state communism will bring about the socialisation of means of production. It means that the means of production will not be in the hands of any one class but in the hands of society as a whole. At this state wage labour will continue to exist and the organising principle of the economy will be: 'from each according to his capacity to each according to his work'. It means that every one will work according to one's ability and get according to the amount of work done. At the second and the final stage the communist society will ensure the end of man's domination by the objective forces. As already stated communism for Marx is not only the positive abolition of private property but also the abolition of state and abolition of human self-alienation. It will be a class less and stateless society in which government of men will be replaced by administration of things. It will be return of man to himself as a social, i.e. really human being. Communism is viewed by Marx as the true final solution of the conflict between existence and essence; objectification and self affirmation; freedom and necessity; individual and the species.

Marx also claimed that communism is the final solution to the riddle of history and knows itself to be this solution. Man in communism will become conscious of himself as the prime mover of history as well as its product. As stated earlier, since communism will ensure the disappearance of social division of labour; it will become possible for man to do one thing to day, another tomorrow "to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening and criticise after dinner without ever becoming a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd or a critic' (*German Ideology*). Moreover, it will be a state of plenty where every one will work according to capacity (ability) and get according to need. The creation of new needs will also ensure the creation of means for their satisfaction. History will not come to an end; it will continue' in terms of creation of new needs and creation of methods of their fulfillment.

It should be noted that under communism alienation will come to an end but labour will continue to remain a vital need. The sphere of material production will remain' in the realm of necessity. The realm of freedom will begin only in the leisure time. Thus, work will continue to be an obligation even in a communist society.

(b) Marx's theory of historical materialism

Ans.

The most seminal contribution of Marx is his theory of historical materialism. In his *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* Engels defined historical materialism as a theory which holds that the ultimate cause which determines the whole course of human history is the *economic* development of society. The whole course of human history is explained in terms of changes occurring in the modes of production and exchange. Starting with primitive *communism* the mode of production has passed through three stages: slavery, feudalism and capitalism and the consequent division of society into distinct classes (slave-master, serf-baron and proletariat-capitalist) and the struggle of these classes against one another. The most profound statement of Marx which explains his theory of historical materialism is contained in his Preface *to* a Contribution to the Critique of Political *Economy* In this work Marx contends that:

> the economic structure of society, constituted by its relations *of production* is the real foundation of society. It is the *basis* on which rises a legal and political *super-structure* and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. Along with it, the society's *relations* of production themselves correspond to a definite stage of development of its material productive forces. Thus, the mode of production of material life determines the social, political and intellectual life process in general.

The general relations as well as forms of state are to be grasped neither from themselves nor from the so-called general development of human mind, but rather they have their roots in the material conditions of life. As the society's productive forces develop (animate energy getting replaced by inanimate energy—for example oxen ploughing getting replaced by ploughing with tractor) they clash with the existing relations of production which become a fetter on their further growth. Thus, begins the epoch of social revolution. This contradiction between *forces of production* and relations of production divides the society into classes. As people become conscious of this conflict they fight it out. The conflict is resolved in favour of the productive forces and new, higher relations of production, whose material conditions have matured in the womb of the old society emerge. The bourgeois mode of production not only represents the most recent of several progressive epochs, but it is the last antagonistic form of production. Marx's materialist interpretation of history thus explains the general course of human history in terms of growth of productive forces. The productive forces, as already pointed out, consist of means of production (machines, tools and factories) and labour power. The relations of production correspond to society's productive level. In addition to ancient, *feudal* and bourgeois modes of production Marx also talked of the Asiatic *mode of production*. On the one hand, Marx distinguished between forces of production and relations of production on the other lie distinguished between the base and the super-structure. For Marx, the productive forces are not objective economic forces which do not require the mediation of human consciousness for their emergence or existence. Likewise, the distinction between the material base and the ideological super-structure is not the distinction between matter and spirit but between conscious human activity aimed at the creation and preservation of conditions of human life, and human consciousness which provide rationalisation and legitimisation of specific form that human activity takes.

Like his dialectics, Marx constructed his materialist conception of history out of the Hegelian system itself which had sought to bridge the gap between the *rational* and the *actual*. Marx, in fact, borrowed such concepts as civil society and property from the Hegelian system and set them in a revolutionary relationship to the concept of the state. Hegel confronts civil society as a *sphere of materialism* and counter-poses it to the state as *sphere of idealism*. In sharp contrast to this, Marx holds that relations as well as forms of state are to be grasped neither from themselves, nor from the so-called general development of human mind but rather they have their roots in the material conditions of life. You must also understand the way in which Marx differentiates between his materialist conception of history and Hegelian idealist conception of history. To Hegel, it is the life process of the human mind, i.e. the process of thinking which under the name of the idea gives momentum to history. Thus, for Hegel, the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of the idea, while for Marx the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by human mind and translated into forms of thought. To put it differently, while in the Hegelian scheme *consciousness determines existence;* in the Marxian scheme it is the *social being* (conditions of existence) that *determine their consciousness*. Thus, the relationship between economic and the political in Marx is such that the political structure reflects the socio-economic conditions. It is the economic fact of life, which produce or determine the nature of ideas. Thus, Marx reduced all thought and activity to the material conditions of life. Consciousness is nothing but the reflection of material conditions of men's

existence. However, this relationship between material conditions and ideas is not necessarily direct and automatic. It is rather complex. Marx expressed his position in a very technical language. He argued that the doctrine that men are products of circumstances and up-bringing and that, therefore, changed men are products of other circumstances and changed up-bringing forgets that it is men that change circumstances and that educator himself needs education.

The above statement of Marx will help you to understand that in Marx epistemology ceases to be merely a reflective theory of cognition but becomes a vehicle for shaping and molding reality. Thus, Marx's epistemology occupies a middle position between classical (mechanical) materialism and classical idealism. Since, it synthesises the two traditions, it transcends the classical dichotomy between subject and object. In short, Marx denies the validity of traditional mechanistic materialist modes of consciousness. To Marx, reality is always human reality, not in the sense that man shapes nature because this act of shaping nature also shapes man and his relation to other human beings. It is a total process, implying a constant interaction between subject and object "My relationship to my surroundings is my consciousness".

In a subtle sense, the Marxian philosophy of historical materialism is different not only from Hegelian philosophy; it is also different from that of Feuerbach. While Feuerbach saw the unity of man and nature expressed by man's being a part of nature, Marx sees man as shaping nature and his being, in turn, shaped by it. To put it in simple words, whereas Feuerbach *naturalises man*, Marx *humanises nature*. Marx argued that man not only satisfies his needs through his contact with nature but also creates new needs as well as possibilities of their satisfaction. Thus, according to Marx, man's needs are historical not naturalistic. The never-ending dialectical pursuit of their creation and satisfaction constitutes the main course historical development. Here again, the Marxist position is different from pragmatists. While pragmatism starts with the premise that man adopts himself to a given pre-existing environment, Marx views man not adopting himself to the environment but shaping his world. To put it differently, reality is viewed by classical materialism and pragmatism as if it were merely a passive object of perception; while, for Marx, reality is not only shaped by man but it also reacts on man himself and shapes him. Thus, it is a two-way interaction: man shaping nature and getting shaped by nature.